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I
INTRODUCTION

The offerings of applied empirical social psychological researchers to the
law tend to resemble those of civil engineers inventing new techniques for
construction companies or electrical engineers adapting basic knowledge for
the consumer electronics industry. They assume that their client institutions
want more accurate measures, more robust materials, higher signal-to-noise
ratios, more hits, and fewer misses. If the law is a decisionmaking machine,
runs this implicit reasoning, then surely it will be eager to adopt findings and
techniques that will allow it to make more correct and fewer incorrect
decisions, and to do so at greater speed and lower cost.
In at least some respects, the law encourages such an interpretation of
itself: We term it a system,' and we speak often of the reliability of evidence,
the search for truth,2 and the avoidance of error. We note the efficiency of the
common law," the unrestrained opportunities for taking judicial notice of
legislative facts, 4 and the law's welcoming of new scientific and technical
knowledge 5 of various kinds through expert witnesses. Moreover, many
features of the law do lend themselves to empirical study, have been studied,
and have yielded interesting and potentially useful new knowledge.1i
Nevertheless, numerous findings of empirical social science that may inform
procedural choices have not been embraced by legal policy.
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1. For examples, consider the following titles: E. FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO TlnE
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (1983); J. STONE, FILIE LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS
(1964); JUSTICE SYSTEM JOURNAL.
2.
"[hese rules shall he construed ...

to the end that the truth may be ascertained .

FED.

R. EVID. 102.
3.

R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12 (3d ed. 1986).

4.
5.

See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note.
Giannelli, The Admissibilitv of .Vovel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. U.S. .1 Ilalf-Centnry Late, 80

COLUM. L. REX'. 1197, 1199 (1980).

6. To some extent, this two-part issue of Law and Contempoiry Problenms is an attempt to
highlight such knowledge. Organizations such as the Federal Judicial Centei, the State Justice
Institute. and the National Center for State Courts exist in part to pursue and support the pursuit of
such knowledge. For more information regarding the purposes and functions of these three
organizations, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-639 (1982 & Supp. 1986): 42 U.S.C. §§ 10701-10713 (Supp.
1986); and The National Cenier for Slate Coitis, STATE CT. J., Winter 1977, at 2, respectively.
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If we put aside the possibility-even the likelihood-that some or many
social science findings are premature, are based on insufficient data, or are
just plain wrong (and by some magic the law "knows" that), we still find well
understood phenomena being ignored or, worse, we find the law moving in a
direction precisely opposite to the implications of the data. At other times the
law embraces erroneous findings and non-expertise (my euphemism for wellintended quackery or outright charlatanism) and displays a determined need
not to hear data that tend to reveal and correct the errors.
Of course, the principal purpose of the legal process is not to obtain
correct answers; it is to resolve disputes. Finding facts is merely instrumental
to the larger purpose of the legal process; it plays a supporting and not a
leading role. The legal process is a truth-seeking enterprise only insofar as
truth is needed to resolve disputes. And, inevitably, at some point, the
processes of truth-finding could grow to exact costs (dollars, time,
intrusiveness, and so on) that exceed any benefit the parties or society could
gain from the effort. At some point the game is not worth the candle. The
law must impose some limitation on the development of its truth-finding
methods before the litigation system becomes bogged down in its own efforts
to do its job well.
Moreover, the issues that usually present themselves include both
cognitive conflicts that are best resolved through factfinding and
distributional conflicts that require making other kinds of judgments. 7 This
mixture may help explain some of the choices the law makes in structuring its
procedures and deciding what kinds of evidence to admit. The consideration
of facts depends upon their relevance, and their relevance is determined by
the applicable substantive law. The resources the law is willing to devote to
finding materially relevant facts may depend upon how pivotal those facts are
to the case. In resolving disputes involving mixed questions of cognitive
uncertainty and distributional conflict, still other considerations may
dominate the process and the decisions reached. Therefore, it is essential to
realize the important but limited part that factfinding plays in dispute
resolution.

In addition, the dispute resolution process itself resides within a larger
political system. Any dispute resolution process has to be satisfying to the

disputants, including the losing parties, and to the larger society." At various
stages of our society's development, that may mean preferring one set of
procedures rather than another, even if the favored rule reduces rather than
increases the system's factfinding capability.
Given these observations, it is noteworthy that, if anything, the values of
the larger culture and the legal culture seem over time to have moved toward
an increased insistence on true as well as correct results, raising the
importance of the factfinding component of the dispute resolution process.
7.

8.
(1975).

Thibaut & Walker, A Theor, of Procedure, 66 CALI. L. REV. 541 (1978).
See g'enerall(y J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCFDURAL JUSICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAI. ANALYSIS
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We could resolve disputes expeditiously and unambiguously by tossing a coin
to decide liability. Or we could submit our cases to an oracular examiner of
chicken entrails. An answer would emerge. But such decision processes
would quickly erode public confidence and would soon be abandoned. The
evolution of a societal preference for reducing fact-based uncertainties has
apparently been mirrored in the law by this century's increased use of
discovery and more porous rules of evidence. And error, especially the
demonstrable kind, has its own costs, both to immediate parties and to the
perceived legitimacy of the legal system.
It is precisely in light of such considerations of the proper role to be
played by factfinding in the legal process that some of the choices made by the
law become most puzzling. With little imagination we could explain why the
law might refuse to make use of a complex and costly factfinding tool that
added only marginally to the factfinder's understanding, or even why the law
would fail to avail itself of inexpensive and relevant knowledge. But it is hard
to explain why-in a society that both places a high value on accuracy and
efficiency and desires to keep political control out of the hands of technocratic
experts-courts would make increasing use of sources of knowledge that add
very little to-or, indeed, subtract from-the accuracy of legal factfinding.
This practice becomes even more puzzling when the courts' measures
increase the expense and duration of the legal process and place much
discretion in the hands of experts rather than judges or juries. If the law is
making such counterproductive choices-and I aim to show that it is doing so
openly-then the legal process not only is failing to serve the public as well as
it might, but it is also running the risk that once word gets around, public
respect for the legal process will wane. In a sense, this article is an inquiry
into whether these seemingly irrational choices can be explained by a deeper
inspection of the functioning of our legal process. Perhaps there are broader
and more important functions of the system that are served by choices that
appear counterproductive when viewed in a narrow scope.
II
SOCIAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE AND THE ENHANCEMENT
OF ACCURATE FACTFINDING

This section reviews a number of examples of social science findings that
throw light on the quality of the law's factfinding and suggest improvements
to the design of the law as a decisionmaking system in the sense of enhancing
the accuracy of its findings.
A.

Evaluation of Overall Reliability and Validity

As a system of deciding disputes, the law aims to achieve reliability, at
least, and validity, if possible. Thus, the law ought to strive to treat like cases
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alike (reliability) - and, if possible, to make the correct decision on those
similarly treated similar cases (validity).'0
The problem of assessing validity presents a greater challenge in law than
in any other field. Geologists can see if oil is where they think it is or if
earthquakes strike where and when predicted; physicians can perform
autopsies to test the accuracy of their diagnoses; clinical psychologists can
look to actual behavior as a criterion against which to compare the accuracy of
their tests. But the adjudicative factfinding part of the law operates only in a
retrospective, historical mode, and can never truly test its findings against
some external criterion. II Moreover, the law contains a central thread that is
absent from comparable institutions that engage in similarly complex
decisionmaking: the value of equal treatment. Patients may complain that
they did not receive the best or most up-to-date care; they do not complain
that they were not treated equally. Litigants can and do make such complaints
against the legal system, and the system takes those complaints seriously.
The unusual difficulty of finding a criterion against which to test the
correctness of trial outcomes and the special concern in the law for equal
process lead to an emphasis on reliability, rather than validity, in evaluating
2
the working of the law. '
How reliable are legal factfinders? One well-known source of data on this
point is the work of Kalven and Zeisel.'' In a number of jury trials, by
comparing verdicts of civil juries with verdicts that judges said they would
have rendered if the trials had been bench trials, it was found that judges and
juries agreed on the verdict in 79 percent of the cases.' 4 Even this study
9. In measurement theory, reliability is defined as the ability of a measure to produce the same
result each time the same object or event is evaluated by the measuring device. J. MONAHAN & L.
WALKER, SOCIAL. SCIENCE IN LAw 43-45 (1985). The same notion is captured by the law's recognition
of the need to treat like cases alike.
10. Validity is defined as the ability of a measure to measure what it purports to measure. J.
MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 9. To analogize to ideas familiar to lawyers, once we are satisfied
that like cases are treated alike, we can ask whether the correct decisions have been reached on those
similar cases.
1I.
Empirical science has a decisionmaking limitation that parallels the law's. The eflects of one
variable on another are never known with certainty, but only to the degree that assumptions of nondifference, or null hypotheses (the equivalent of presumptions in the law), can be rejected when
sufficient data (evidence) are accumulated in an experiment to meet the required level of significance
(standard of proof). In this way, the fundamental logic of hypothesis testing and legal factfinding are
remarkably similar. The language is different, but the concepts and logic are strikingly parallel. The
problem remains, however, that the two fields aim their respective factfinding machinery in different
directions: the law toward bits of mundane and disputed history (adjudicative facts); social science
toward repeatable phenomena (typically, legislative facts). Without turning to or reinventing social
science methods or findings, the law cannot answer its questions about the efforts of alternative legal
procedures.
12. See Walker, Peifecting Federal Civil Rules: .. I Proposal for Restricted Field EAxpeiiwents, LAW &
CONTrEMP. PRoBS., Summer 1988, at 67.

13. Unlortunately, these two researchers never fully analyzed their laboriously collected civil
data, and now those data have been lost. Only the criminal data have been analyzed and reported in
detail, in H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURV (1966).

See infra note 14.

14. Judges and juries wotuld both find for plaintiffs in 44% of cases, both for defendants in 35%
of cases, judge for plaintiffs and jury for defendants in 10% of cases, and judge for defendants and
50 VA. I.. Ri:v. 1055, 1065 (1964).
jury for plaintiffs in 11% ofcases. Kalven, Digniy of the CivilJwo.
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provides only a proxy answer to the question of reliability; these data do not
tell what happens if the same case is "measured" repeatedly by the legal
system by submitting the same case repeatedly to the system.' 5 But let us take
what we have to be the estimate of the system's reliability.
Is 79 percent agreement good or bad? It is less than perfect, to be sure.
And the lower end of the scale of possibilities is not 0 percent but 50
percent-the level of agreement that would be reached if judge and jury
tossed a coin to decide their respective verdicts.'" To be below 50 percent
agreement would be astonishing as well as disturbing. Perhaps the best
standard of evaluation is to compare the courts with makers of other complex
decisions. Table 1 reproduces data provided by Diamond.' 7 The civil verdict
agreement rate of 79 percent is at least equal, and sometimes superior, to the
agreement rate of National Science Foundation ("NSF") and National
Academy of Sciences ("NAS") peer reviewers, employment interviewers,
psychiatrists and physicians making diagnostic decisions, and judges making
sentencing decisions. Thus, the legal process produces verdicts whose
reliability sets a standard to which physicians, scientists, and business people
might aspire.
Despite this relatively impressive performance, the general public and
even lawyers commonly believe that one never knows what a judge or jury will
do. Unreliability of decisionmaking is often cited as one of the major
problems with the civil justice system' 8 that necessitates reform. Based on
these data, one might think that the public would believe that one never
knows what physicians/NSF or NAS scientists/employment interviewers and
so on will do, and that the public would be pressing for reforms of those
institutions.
15. And this cannot really be the end of an inquiry about the reliability of the legal machine.
The level of judge-jury agreement found by Kalven and Zeisel could have been achieved because the
same legally irrelevant, or even legally impermissible, ingredient determined the outcome (for
example, the occupation of the plaintiff). And reliance on such irrelevant data would violate, not
effectuate, the doctrine of' equal protection. Thus, the statistical evidence of reliability might be
grounded on practices that are anti-reliable as between parties who are legallv similarly situated.
16. [he combinations of coins would be: HH or'1'50% of the time, and H "or TH 50% of the
time. That exhausts the possibilities.
17. Diamond, Order m the Cowrt: Consistency in Criminal Court Decisions. in 2 -1t1E MASTE R LECTURE
SERIES, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 119, 125 (C. Scheirer & B. Hammonds eds. 1983).
18. One of the central themes of the literature of the "civil liability crisis" in the past few years
has been unpredictable and inconsistent decisionmaking by the civil justice system. For example, the
Model Health Care Provider Liability Reform Act section 2(a)(3) states that one of the principal
problems it confronts is "the unpredictability of medical malpractice awards," and section 2(b) of the
Act states that one of the benefits it promises is "to establish greater predictability." The Description,
which accompanies the Act, states, "Specifically, the current tort system, fiequently described as a
litigation lottery, lacks predictability." U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs., Model Health Care
Provider Liability Reform Act §§ 2(a)(3), (b) (1988).
Some of the empirical research in this area focuses on dichotomous liability verdicts; other
research focuses on continuous awards. More research exists on the former than the latter. Kalven,
supra note 14, reports that while civil juries and judges had a high level of agreement on liability, the
juries reached award amounts that averaged 20% higher than those judges would have awarded.
More discussion of awards appears in the next section.
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1

RELIABILITY OF COMPLEX DECISIONMAKING

IN SEVERAL FIELDS

INTERJUDGE CONSISTENCY IN COMPLEX HUMAN JUDGMENTS

Decisionmakers
NSF versus NAS peer
reviewers
7 employment
interviewers
4 experienced
psychiatrists
2 1-23 practicing
physicians

3,576 judge-jury pairs
12 federal judges
8 federal judges

Stimulus
150 grant proposals

submitted to NSF
10 job applicants
153 patients interviewed
twice, once by each of 2
psychiatrists
3 patient-actors with
presenting symptoms
(Doctors could request
further information and
could order and receive
test results).
3,576 jury trials
460 presentence reports
(at sentencing council)
439 presentence reports

Decision

Rate of
agreement
between
2 judges (%)

To fund or not to fund
(half funded by NSF)
Ranked in top 5 or in
bottom 5
Psychosis, neurosis,
character disorder

75

Diagnosis: correct or
incorrect
Probability of
agreement (both correct
or both incorrect)"

67,77,70

Guilty or not guilty
Custody or no custody

78
80

Custody or no custody

79

70
70

55,65,57

(at sentencing council)
" Inflated because physicians could also be inaccurate in different ways.
Source: Diamond, Order in the Cowt: CoisistenO in Criminal Decisions, in 2 TiuF MASTER LECTURE
SERIES, PSYCHOiLOGv AND TIE LAW 119, 125 (C. Scheirer & B. Hammonds eds. 1983).
Copyright © 1983 by the American Psychological Association

One might think, further, that just as all of these other institutions wish to
improve the reliability of their decisions,"t so would the law seek to adopt
reforms, or at least some fine-tuning, that would enhance the reliability of the
-'1
civil justice system's decisionmaking.,
B.

Juries

Research on judge-jury reliability represents only the beginning of the
study of juries as a component of the legal process. This is the area of the
most extensive social-psychological research germane to the legal process. It
19. Reliability is a major concern in psychology, medicine, and other fields. See. e.g., Bates &
Saxe, Reimbwrsement for Pvchotherapy: Linking L'fficacy Reseaich and Public Poliovmakin, 38 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 918 (1983); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF IECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE QUALITY OF
MEDICAL CARE:

INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS 3-7 (1988).

20. I will discuss particular examples of the law moving away from reliability in areas such as jury
size and polygraph use later in this article. Another instance of the law ignoring empirical research is
illustrated by the widespread belief in a -litigation explosion" among legislators despite evidence to
the contrary. See generalv Galanter, 7'he Day .t1/er the Litigalion Explosion. 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Saks,
/ 7'here Be a Crisis lion' Shall e Know It?. 46 MD. I. REV. 63 (1986).
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includes studies of jury composition effects, 2 1 competence,2 - complex civil
2 4 persuasion, 2 5litigation, 2 : effects of unanimous versus quorum verdicts,

27
2
communication and influence within thejury, 6 the decisionmaking process,

and a diverse collection of studies of how different kinds of information affect
2
(or do not affect) juries' decisions. 1

I will focus here on a simple and familiar issue that is rather well
researched and understood, and on which the Supreme Court has spoken
(repeatedly) 2 - and legislatures have acted: the size of the civil jury. Recall our
discussion at the beginning of this article on one of the most fundamental
concerns of the legal decisionmaking process: its reliability, in the sense of
producing consistent and predictable results. What is the relationship
between the size of the jury and the reliability of the decisions it makes?
This is one of the easier questions for a statistician or social scientist to
answer.

Moreover, the answer has been recognized in an opinion of the

United States Supreme Court,"" even as that opinion again affirmed the right
of states to reduce juries to groups as small as six. The general relationship
has been summarized by Hans and Vidmar:
A statistical analysis reveals that over two-thirds of the twelve-person juries will have
damage awards close to the community average, compared to just half of the sixperson juries. The six-person juries are four times as likely to have extremely low or
extremely high average damage awards. Hence, the twelve-person jury should
provide a more accurate and a more reliable reflection of the community's
assessment.3 I

In fact, we can calculate the resulting increase in error' 2 with precision. All
things being equal, a reduction of group size by one-half increases variability
(error, unreliability) by a factor of 1.4 1.:':'
and Empircal, 17 JURIMETRIcs J. 3
21. See genrally Saks, Pie Linits of Scientifi Jirv Selection. Elia
(1976).
22. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISLI., sipra note 13; R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON,
INSIDE TH JURY (1983).
23. See geerally Lempert, Civilfnries and Complex Cases: Lets ,Vot Ruish toiadgment. 80 MICH. L. REV.
68 (1981); M. SAKS, SMALL-GROUP DECISION MAKING. ANI) COMPLEX INFORMATION IASKS (1981).
II)(;ING TiEJUR' 171-75
24. Seegewrally M. SAKS, JIJRv ViRDicis (1977); V. HANS & N. VImIAR.
(1986).
25. See M. SAKS & R. HASTI, SOCI\L PSYCHOLOGY IN COURTr 101-10 (1978).
26. Id. at 72-99.
27. See geierally R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, snpra note 22.
28. See review in V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 24, at 113-63, 179-217.
29. See genera/ly Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978): Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 68 (1970).
30. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 232-33.
31. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 24, at 167.
32. At least that portion that is attributable to the statistical effects.
33. The standard error associated with samples of any size is given by the formula:
r,, -

or

-:

If the .V is ,reduced, then a, will increase; if .V is reduced bv one half, a,. will increase by the square
root o" two, that is. 1.4 1. This applies to dollar awards. A similar result occurs for a dichotomous
variable such as verdicts.
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Some confirmation of this effect comes from recent studies of civil jury
awards. Figure 1 represents jury awards in medical malpractice cases in Cook
County, Illinois. 3 4 The divergence between the 10th and 90th percentiles in
awards plotted over time depicts the increase in variability. While this may be
due to something other than reduction in jury size, it certainly is consistent
5
with expectations.1
FIGURE 1
RAND DATA ON CHICAGO MALPRACTICE TRIAL AWARDS

1000

.~0

320

0

100

o0 a
M.

32

10

65
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75

Year
Source: NI.
COUNTY.

PFrERSON & G. PRIESI,

IINOIS,

l'HEF CIVIL. JURY: TIRENDS

IN TRIAILS AND VERDICTS, COOK

1960- 1979 (R-288 I -1(J). at 35 (1982) (Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corp.).

Knowledge of the relationship between the size of the decisionmaking
group and reliability provides the legal system with a means to increase or
decrease the variability in verdicts and awards with some precision. To
reduce the range of random variation in awards, we need only increase the

M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, IHE CIVII.JuRY: IRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY,
1960-1979 (1982) (published by the Rand Corp.). We do not know the actual size
distribution of juries in Chicago; such studies are still needed. Illinois law provides that where claims
for damages do not exceed $15,000, the trial shall be a jury of six unless one of the parties demands
trial by a jury of 12. Cases where the damages claim exceeds $15,000 are to be tried before juries of
12 unless the parties agree to a lesser size. h1.1.. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1105 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1988).
35. Research is required to test competing explanations for the divergence. Almost certainly, a
subsianial portion of the increase in variability is due to the reduction in jury size.
34.

ILLINOIS,
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size of the decisionmaking body;3 "t to increase the error, we need only reduce
the size of the group.
C.

Forensic Science Proficiency Testing

Although not usually thought of as social science research, I would include
in the present discussion the proficiency testing studies recently undertaken in
the forensic sciences. 3 7 I think these studies may be properly classified as
social science research because the behavior of forensic scientists is the
subject of inquiry. The proficiency of forensic scientists is tested by sending
them known quantities of hair, blood, fingerprints, handwriting, and so on to
examine and analyze. In an actual case, one can never know with certainty
whether the known sample and the questioned sample came from the same
source. However, in these tests, the source of each sample is known by the
manufacturer of the test materials. Thus, the performance of forensic
scientists can be tested by comparing their answers against the known
characteristics and origins of the materials tested. The result provides both
reliability data (the extent to which forensic scientists agree with each other in
answering the same problem) and validity data (the accuracy of their
answers).:"

The forerunner of the present program of proficiency testing was
conducted by Peterson, Fabricant, Field, and Thornton.n'- Their findings,
summarized in Table 2,4 0 provide data on a wide array of forensic science subdisciplines. I have developed a special curiosity about the reliability and
validity of document examiners' conclusions concerning whether a known and
4
a questioned writing were written by the same person. 1

36. This theory has its limits, of course, because %N
e are dealing here not only with a statistical
phenomenon, but a social one as well. Above a certain size, the social processes of group
communication and decisionmaking ssould overwhelm the several advantages of group size, thereby
degrading the group's performance. See generollv N. SAKS, supra note 23; I. STEINER, GROUP PROCESS
AND PRODUCriVITY 83 (1972).
37. For a detailed analysis of these testing programs, see generally Lucas, Leete & Field, An
.American Proficiencv Testing Program, 27 FORENSIC SCI. INr'I. 71 (1985).
38. Proficiency studies can be defined to set more demanding levels of acceptable performance:
Not only must one get the "right" answer, one must do so by use of the proper tests. For this reason,
the figure of 71.2% unacceptable responses in Table 2 may be interpreted to overstate the invalidity
of the findings of blood testing.
39. J. PETERSON, E. FABRICANT, K. FIELD & J. TIIORNTON, CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY
TESTINc; RE.SEARCII iROGRAM (1978) (U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
40. Id. at 251.
4 1. See generalv Risinger, Denbeatix & Saks, Exorcism of Igworance as a Pro.xvor Rational KnoUledge:
The leson.n of llandwrnnling Identnncation "E.Yper/ise. - 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 731 (1989).
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TABLE

2

CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM
PERCENTAGES

OF LABORATORIES REPORTING RESULTS OF "UNACCEPTABLE

Number "unacceptable"

x

responses

PROFICIENCY"

100 = Percen "Unacceptable"

Number of laboratories responding with data

Sample
Number

Sample Type

Number of Labs
Responding With
Data

Number of
"Unacceptable"
Responses

% of Laboratories
Submitting "Unacceptable"
Responses

Drugs .............
Firearms ...........
Blood .............
G lass ..............
Paint ..............
Drugs .............
Firearms ...........
Blood .............
G lass ..............
Paint ..............
Soil ...............
Fibers .............
Physiological Fluids
(A & B) ...........

205
124
158
129
121
181
132
132
112
111
93
120

16
35
6
6
24
3
7
94
35
57
33
2

7.8
28.2
3.8
4.8
20.5
1.7
5.3
71.2
31.3
51.4
35.5
1.7

129

14
15
16
17
18

Arson .............
Drugs .............
Paint ..............
Metal .............
Hair (A,B,C,D,&E)

118
143
103
68
90

(A) 3
(B) 2
34
26
35
15
45
25

19
20

W ood .............
Questioned
Documents (A&B) .

65

14

(A) 2.3
(B) 1.6
28.8
18.2
34.0
22.1
(A)50.0
(B)27.8
(C)54.4
(D)67.8
(E)35.6
21.5

74

Firearms ...........

88

4
14
12

(A) 5.4
(B)18.9
13.6

I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

21

Dog
Cat
Deer
Cow
Mink

Source: J. PETERSON, E. FABRICANT, K. FIELD &_. THORNTON, CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY
TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAM 251 (1978).

The data on document examiner proficiency have been summarized as
follows:
A rather generous reading of the data would be that in 45% of the reports forensic
document examiners reached the correct finding, in 36% they erred partially or
completely, and in 19% they were unable to draw a conclusion. If we assume that
inconclusive examinations do not wind up as testimony in court, and omit the
inconclusive reports, and remain as generous as possible within the bounds of reason,
then the most we can conclude is this: Document examiners were correct 57% of the
time and incorrect 43% of the time.
But let us turn to more meaningful readings of the aggregate data .... Disguised
handwriting fooled them all and forged printing fooled two-thirds of those who
hazarded an opinion about it ....
If a correct answer consists of a report containing correct conclusions returned
pursuant to requested and submitted test materials, then of the total submissions to
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laboratories in the 1984 through 1987 tests, only 18% gave wholly accurate responses
Finally, consider the possible effect on any aggregate conclusions of the fact that
only a fraction [of police laboratories] even ordered test materials in the first place.
It is at least arguable that, by self-selection, the sample is inherently biased in favor of
the more conscientioius and capable practitioners to begin with. If this is true, the
reported results
would overstate the accuracy of the handwriting examination field
42
generally.
...

These data show that document examiners as a group may not have quite the
expertise that they would like courts to believe they possess, that the outcome
of the case may depend upon which examiner has been called to testify, and
that the level of performance varies with the precise nature of the task at hand.
These data may allow a jury to make a more informed estimate of the weight
to be accorded these witnesses, but they do not yet help a court to know
whether the experts add anything to what jurors might be able to accomplish
43
by their own direct comparison of the writings.
While the data of proficiency studies are somewhat controversial with
respect to how well they inform us about the reliability and validity of the
various forensic science sub-disciplines represented, 44 they certainly are
relevant to the question of the probity of forensic science testimony. Whether
the proficiency data somewhat overstate or understate the actual level of
validity, they strongly suggest that the actual level is almost certainly lower
than the average factfinder's assumption of that level, 4 5 and the basic insight
they give a factfinder about the possibility of error is itself sobering. The
42. Id. at 747-49.
43. Without comparative data, we cannot know if laypersons would do worse, as well as, or
better than document examiners.
44. At the basis of the controversy is an uncertainty as to exactly who is taking the test and how
the interpreter is treating it. Does a laboratory assign the test to a beginner or to the most
experienced person? Does the examiner give it less or more attention than a sample from an active
crime investigation would receive? The answers to these questions are unknown-and the forensic
science discipline may have an interest in obtaining the proficiency data while keeping the
interpretation of it ambiguous.
As discussed in Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 4 I, the earliest attempts to study the
proficiency of document examiners found them to be so elusive and resistant that it simply was not
possible to subject their claimed abilities to controlled stud.I Modern proficiency studies, which
include most or all laborator forensic sciences, are carefulily shrouded in anonymity. The test
producers invite laboratories to participate; those who choose to participate do not send in
identifying information with their answers; to find out how well they did, each laboratory can
compare the answers they gave to an answer key and report of how labs in the aggregate did. The
test producers know how well those laboratories that participated did, in general, but they cannot
know ssho sent back answers, who did not, and who did how wsell. Even these aggregate results are
not published or otherwise made accessible to the public, courts, lawyers, or even to forensic
scientists who (lid not participate.
It seems clear that forensic scientists have been unusually slow to subject themselves to such
testing, and now that they have begun to do it. they have gone to considerable trouble to keep the
results quiet and anonymous (so that no given practitioner or laboratory has to be answerable for its
performance). One can only speculate on the advantages this creates. Here is one speculation: If
one is working in a discipline whose evidentiary offerings go largely unchallenged by opposing
lawyers and are blindly accepted byjudges andjtiries, then one has nothing to gain and everything to
lose by subjecting one's claimed abilities to tests and making the results known.
45. Saks & Wissler, Legal and PDvchological Bases of Expert Tesimony. 2 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 435,
443-45 (1984).
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interesting question, then, becomes whether these data are proffered to
courts and, if so, whether they are admitted or acknowledged through judicial
46
notice.
Although courts generally are open to forensic science evidence, they do
not appear eager to admit evidence about the reliability and validity of forensic
science evidence-that is, evidence about the evidence. Some regard it as
simply not relevant (proficiency data are about other forensic scientists in
other places at other times doing other cases, not about this forensic scientist
here today in this case); others find more elaborate explanations for its
47
inadmissibility.
Walker and Monahan, however, suggest that the use of data about general
proficiency to make an individualized judgment has become more common,
and they find no barrier to its admissibility in the usual doctrines of evidence
law. They term this kind of use a "framework" use of social science data.
That is, the information about a forensic science's general proficiency
provides a framework for assessing the probity or the weight to be given the
48
testimony of the forensic scientist on the stand in a given proceeding.
Presumably, taking into account the limited reliability and validity of the
proffered evidence would enhance the reliability and validity of the judicial
factfinding process, and vice versa.
D.

Probability Data and Behavioral Decision Theory

The use of background data to go from the general (other forensic
scientists) to the particular (this expert witness) requires some probabilistic
inference by the factfinder. Wheneverjudges orjurors have to make intuitive
probability guestimates, they fill in missing information with implicit
assumptions. And of course they arrive at their estimates without the benefit
of Bayes' theorem (or any other computational aid), but only with their
intuitions about what to make of the information. The law has important
46. The apparent answer is that even as that research sent shock waves through the forensic
science community, it evoked barely a yawn from the legal community. A Westlaw search for
appellate cases citing the proficiency testing literature, in particular the study by j. PETERSON, E.
FABRICAN[, K. FIELD &J. THORNTON, supM note 39, turned up exactly two cases: State v. Flynn, 202
N.J. Super. 215, 220 n.2, 494 A.2d 350, 353 n.2 (1985), and Chappee v. Commonwealth, 659 F.
Supp. 1220, 1221 n.2 (D. Mass. 1987). Both of these courts appear to have taken the findings
seriously and cited them as support for rulings requiring greater scrutiny of forensic science experts.
47. For example, some courts adopt a policy that only one who is qualified as an expert in the
particular forensic science field is qualified to present the proficiency data. By this analysis,
ignorance about the proficiency data in one's field strengthens the barrier to its admission and
strengthens the basic testimony.
The author's source for this point is his own experience in court in ongoing litigation that cannot
be identified, so unfortunately the reader will have to take his word for it that he has seen a trial
judge rule as described.
48. Walker & Monahan, Social Framezworks: , .Vew ise of Social Science iii Law.,
73 VA. L. REx'. 559
(1987). By their analysis, though, the general proficiency data ought to be dealt with as a matter of
law, so that the court may take jtdicial notice of it, receive briefs and arguments on it, and instruct
the jury about it. The court would thus have a duty to notice such data and to advise thejury as to it.
Interestingly, the cotirts still seem to prefer to insulate the jury from knowledge of the limitations of
forensic scientists and other witnesses. See supra note 42.
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choices to make in deciding what to give jurors and what not to give them.
On the one hand, the law wants them to have enough information to reach a
rational judgment. On the other hand, it does not want them to receive
information that will mislead or confuse them. Determining which
information is helpful and which is harmful is a task in which judges can
receive some help from the growing body of empirical research that is carried
out to discover how humans process probabilistic information and draw
intuitive inferences from that information.
Here it is useful to focus on a few examples showing how that knowledge
can assist courts in deciding whether to admit certain kinds of evidence. First,
courts have to decide if probability evidence is to be admitted at all. If it is not
4'
deemed irrelevant solely because of its probabilistic, aggregate character, t
then the court may have to decide if it is sufficient to support a verdict for a
plaintiff. This is, of course, an area of considerable confusion for the law.
Sometimes such evidence is disallowed as not relevant, 5t and sometimes it is
disallowed as being unable on its own to meet the plaintiff's burden of
persuasion. 5 1 Other times the courts gladly welcome what is in form the same
kind of information. 52 They almost always will allow the evidence in if it is
filtered through a case-specific expert witness who is employing the evidence
to reach the opinions being testified to. 53 Probability data can serve at least

two basic purposes in legal factfinding. Such data can be informative as
primary evidence (for example, the probability of lung cancer after exposure
to asbestos is increased five times; after exposure to asbestos plus tobacco,
49. See. e.g.. Tribe, 7'Iial by Mathenmatics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process. 84 HARV. L. RFV.
1329, 1344-50 (1971); Saks & Kidd, Human Itformnation Puocessilg and.-tdjudiaation: 7Tual by Heuristics, 15
LAW & Soc'v REV. 123, 124-25 (1981); McCORMICK ON EvIDENCE § 210 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984);
Walker & Monahan. supia note 48, at 572-75.
50. McCoRMiCK ON EVIDENCE, supa note 49, §§ 209, 210.
51.
Smith v. Rapid Transit, 317 Mass. 469, 470, 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (1945): "[It is not enough
that mathematically the chances somewhat favor a proposition to be proved: for example ... the fact
that only a minority of men die of cancer [would not] warrant a finding that a particular man did not
die of cancer." Bat seeH. HART & J. McNAUGIrTON, EVIDENCE ANt) INFERENCE IN TIHE LAWv 54-55
(1958):
Consider the formula that ina civil
case the facts must be determined on a more-likely-thannot basis. In the first
place, the probabilities are determined in a most subjective and
unscientific wa,: the trier of fact simply asks itself which of the contesting contradictory
propositions according to the trier's limited experience more nearly squares with the
evidence. In the second place, the law refuses to honor its own formula when the evidence
is coldly "statistical."
52. These instances include unexceptional cases involving forensic science and medical
testimony as well as discrimination and toxic tort cases. See generally E. IMWINKEIRIED, SCIENI FIC &
ExPER[ EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1981) (forensic and medical evidence); D. BAi-DUS &J. COI.E, STATiSTICAt,
PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); E. GREER & W. FREEDMAN, ToxIC TORT LITIGATION (1989).
53. The apparent irony here is that this procedure allows the witness to become the
decisionmaker on that point. The case-specific witness could simply report to the factfinder the
relevant facts and then report the underlying aggregate scientific findings. Having made that
explicit, the expert could leave the stand and allow the factfinder to draw the appropriate conclusion.
The expert could even suggest (by opinion) what conclusion one is to draw from the adjudicative
facts combined with the aggregate data framework. However, the court wants just the expert's final
decision. The underlying data can come out if one attorney or the other wants it to. Does the law
actually have a different goal, namely, the exorcism of ignorance? See generally Risinger, Denbeaux &
Saks, supra note 41.
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sixty times), or it can be useful to provide the baserates that give meaning to
primary evidence-a matter to be discussed shortly.
The law both embraces and rejects probability evidence based upon
aggregate data. Such information is what modern scientific knowledge is
made of. If courts embrace such knowledge, it is said that "when statistics
speak, courts listen," or that without such data there would be no way to
resolve the issues before the courts. 54 And, of course, these courts are right.
When courts reject probability evidence, they point out that whatever the
aggregate data show, those data provide no assurance that what is true in
general is true in the particular case before the court; one cannot decide the
particular with certainty on the basis of inferences drawn from general
probabilities. 55 And, of course, these courts are right as well.
The sorting out of these contradictions is in itself a major challenge for
judges and legal scholars. The examples I wish to discuss here involve more
practical concerns about presenting the decisionmaker with the right data in
the best form so as to lead to an intelligent appraisal of the facts of a situation.
In making sense of most adjudicative assertions, baserate information is
helpful, perhaps necessary, and by definition is statistical and probabilistic.
One example from a criminal context will make this clear. Suppose a forensic
scientist takes the stand to report that microscopic glass fragments were found
in the defendant's outer clothing, and these fragments are indistinguishable in
chemical composition and refraction from the glass window that was broken
to gain entry into a victim's home. A factfinder might well conclude that this
is highly identifying information. A court might well hesitate to allow
baserate information about the population of glass fragments, as tending to
cloud the picture. But a factfinder can find the initial expert testimony helpful
only if it is also assumed that the likelihood of finding a "match" 5 is low
unless the defendant was at the victim's home.
In the absence of testimony on these points, how do the factfinders fill in
the missing information? The answer can only be that they make it up; they
guess. The testimony about the glass fragments is diagnostic, or identifying,
only to the degree that the baserate of glass fragments is low. In a study of
this question, criminalists collected outer clothing from a dry cleaner and
examined it for glass fragments. They found that 60 percent of the outer
garments contained fragments that were the same in chemical composition
and refraction as the most common type of window glass. This baserate alone
means that any defendant selected at random stands a 60 percent chance of
being found to possess such fragments. Thus, in this instance, the baserate
shows the weak diagnosticity of the evidence. In other instances, it might
54. See D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF 1 (1983); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCI;, s0pra note 49,
§§ 210-11.
55. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 49, § 210.
56. I am using this term for the purposes of convenience and overstatement. Conscientious
forensic scientists avoid the term "match,'* and instead describe the state of allairs more correctly as
"consistent with the evidence" or, when the probabilities are weak, as "not inconsistent with the
evidence."
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show that the evidence is far more diagnostic than the factfinders might
assume it to be.
Most evidence, and certainly scientific evidence, rests on just such
probabilistic inferences. Sometimes courts reject such evidence as a basis of
liability. 5 7 But in essence these courts are rejecting only the explicit data that

would allow the factfinder to draw an informed inference. To exclude the
baserate data does not make the inference non-probabilistic; it only prevents
the inference from being informed by the data and requires the factfinders to
substitute their guess for the researcher's data. s
Now, assuming a court will allow such baserate evidence, the next
problem concerns the form it should take. Kahneman and Tversky5" have
shown that the way a problem is "framed" for a decisionmaker affects
6
decisions based on identical information. 0
Depending on the form in which the data are presented, the most basic
statement of the same information can push the decisionmaker to err in one
direction or another. Thompson and Schumann"' have demonstrated the
following: Suppose an expert witness supplies information on the degree to
which a defendant and a perpetrator "match" on some characteristic. When
such data are presented in the form of conditional probabilities, an overestimate
is made about the diagnosticity of the information (what Thompson and
Schumann call the "Prosecutor's Fallacy").1 2 A conditional probability would
take the form: "There is only a 2 percent chance the defendant's hair would
be indistinguishable from that of the perpetrator if he were innocent." If the
same information is presented as percentages of a population, the factfinder
underestimates the probativeness of the evidence (the "Defense Attorney's
Fallacy").(" This would take the form: "Only 2 percent of people have hair
that would be indistinguishable from that of the defendant, and therefore in a
57. See MCCORMICK ON EViDENCE, supra note 49, § 210.
58. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 49, at 145-48.
59. Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, 'alnes and Frames, 39 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
60. Here is an example of framing from Kahneman and [versky:
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease,
which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have
been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the
programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and
two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the programs would you favor?
Even though the expected saving of life in the two programs is identical, more than twothirds of people presented with this problem favor Program A. By framing the problem in
reverse, so that the number who die is stated (in Program A 400 will die; in Program B there
is a one-third chance that no one will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will
die), preferences for the programs reverse and Program B is preferred.
Id.
61.
l'hompson & Schumann, lleiprelation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The t'"osecutor's
Fallace and the Defense Alorney Falla, II LAW & HUM. BEH,xV. 167 (1987).
62. Id.at 171.
63. Id.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 5 1: No. 4

city of 1,000,000 people, there would be approximately 20,000 such
individuals."
Related studies of hindsight and attribution phenomena raise concerns
about whether factfinders can adopt the designated burdens of proof and
weigh evidence in the manner the law prescribes or expects. Hindsight
findings show that after people have learned the outcome of an incident, that
knowledge contaminates their assessment of the probability that the injury
would result from the actions that preceded it. They consider the actual
outcome to have been the expected outcome, even when its likelihood may
have been remote, and they are unaware of the effect of the outcome
information on their thinking." 4 Thus, the test for tort negligence, which
directs factfinders to consider the behavior of the defendant ex ante, may be a
test that human factfinders have great difficulty performing well-with the
effect being implicitly to shift the burden of persuasion onto tort defendants.
Similarly, studies of the attribution of responsibility show that the more
serious the injurious outcome, the more motivated observers are to attribute
responsibility to someone, be that the plaintiff or the defendant. 65 The point
is that random happenstance becomes a decreasingly acceptable attribution as
the injury becomes more severe. The studies that demonstrate this effect
present identical actions by the defendant, sometimes resulting in serious and
sometimes in minor damage. The magnitude of the injury is relevant only to
damages; the attribution of liability should be informed only by the
defendant's conduct. Yet, for human decisionmakers, the two are more
connected psychologically. "" The greater the harm done, the greater the
tendency of factfinders to attribute fault to the conduct of someone (usually
the defendant).
Avoidance of such problems might require some restructuring of the way
evidence is presented at trial. For example, the system can avoid these
hindsight and attribution problems to the extent that it can bifurcate trials,
withholding information about the magnitude of injuries and saving that
information entirely for a separate damages phase of a trial. To do this
completely would be difficult, if not impossible, however, since the mere fact
that the trial is taking place tells factfinders that something did not turn out
well, and that some non-trivial injury occurred.
E.

Polygraph

The polygraph has a relatively long past but only a short history. The
notion that involuntary physiological changes are correlated with the
awareness that one is lying is an idea that goes back centuries-at least to the
64. See, e.g., Fischoff, Hindsight 0 Foesigh." The Effect of Ountome Knowledge on j]dgwienI U'der
'ncertainty, I J. EXPERIMENrAL PSYCiOcOuY: Hum. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 297-98 (1975).
65. See. e.g.,
Walster, Assignmnen of Responsibiliv , for an .lcciden, 3 J. PERSONALITV & SOC.
PsN'cnoioc;y 73 (1966).
66. It seems that the same connection holds for judges in deciding whether burdens of proof
have been met. See H. HART & J. McNAUGIHTON, sr[.?a note 51, at 54-55. Judges, too, are human.
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ancient Chinese and Bedouin Arabs.67 While the polygraph itself has existed
for most of this century, serious empirical research on the reliability and
validity of the polygraph examination procedure, of which the hardware and
electronics are only a part, began less than two decades ago."8s A recent
review of that literature by the Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA")
provides the data in Tables 3A and 3B. When used in specific crime
investigation, the polygraph performs at the level of validity shown in the
tables."' t The test's performance varies from study to study, but together the
studies provide an approximate sense of the technique's ability to classify
people as uttering what they believe to be truths or lies in specific crime
situations. Used proficiently, 7 11the polygraph technique is a clever tool which,
like so many human inventions, has the capability to improve upon our
unaided skills.
When we compare the ability of laypersons to detect lying, which is
discussed in the next section, with the ability of well-conducted polygraph
examinations, there appears to be no contest. Despite all of their experience
and intuition, people are not skilled in the unaided detection of lying. With
all of its limitations, 7 ' the polygraph examination process, in capable hands,
errs less often. 72 Yet, the law's attitude toward this means of credibility
assessment is clear. The right and power of jurors and judges to assess
witness credibility intuitively is strongly protected and preserved-despite the
fact that demeanor adds little to transcripts in terms of accuracy, and despite
the fact that some of the very cues that factfinders are expected to rely upon
actually reduce the accuracy of their assessments. Nevertheless, the law resists
67. J. BRIGHAM, SOCIAl. PSNCIIOiOGY 458 (1986).
68. This line of research was pioneered by David Raskin. He and l)avid Lykken, known for his
criticisms of the polygraph method and for his alternative questioning method (the Guihtv
Knowledge Test). have been at odds through most of the history of empirical research on polygraph
testing. See L. S..XE, 1). DouGiJERTY & T. CROSS, SCIFrNrIIIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPiH -TESTIN(;: A
RESEARCH REVIEW & EVAIUAIroN-A TECHNICAIL MEMORANDUM 29-43 (1983) (U.S. Congress, Office

of Technology Assessment, OTA-TM-H-15).
69. Although these data appear rather impressive, it is only fair to note that the report from
which they come is filled with caution about the risks of error. Id. at 4. As we shall see, if the
standard is comparison with ahernative sources of assessment that the law otherwise relies on, there
seems little question that polygraph examination, employed proficiently (no small worry in itself, as
we should appreciate fiom the above discussion of forensic science proficiency), is the easy winner,
even with its imperfections.
70. Again, the caution word: proficient.
71. The most important limitation is that the data support its use only for the investigation of
specific events which have occurred, not for employment screening, periodic security checks, and
similar uses. The second limitation is that examiners must be proficient and blind to other
information about the case under investigation. L. SAXE, D. )OUGHER-1r & I. CROSS, supa note 68,
at 4-6. Although the Office of Technology Assessment report displays a high degree of concern fo
false positives and for the possibility of countermeasures introduced by those taking the test, in the
trial context these problems are at least as severe when the examiner is a judge or juror and the
witness is even a halfway skilled liar. See Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, infra note 78.
72. One argument against reliance on polygraph procedures, even at apparently high levels of
current accuracy, is that those who wish to deceive can use biofeedback to learn to control their
bodily reactions and thereby to fool the test. L. SAXE, 1). DouGHERTY & F. CRoss, slupa note 68, at
89. That, apparently, is what has already happened with demeanor evidence, though in more natural
and less technologically self-conscious ways.
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the admission of polygraph examination evidence and rests heavily on
demeanor evidence and the factfinder's assumed ability to use it. Where
polygraph evidence is admissible at all, the admission is almost always made
by stipulation between the parties.
Courts never have said, and do not now say, that they will never admit
polygraph evidence. They have said, 731 and continue to say, 7 4 that if the test
ever achieves an acceptable level of accuracy, rational courts will welcome it.
But consider these generous views of the Arizona Supreme Court in State v.
Valdez, and ask what they may reveal about the law's underlying attitude
toward polygraph testing:
A conservative estimate of the accuracy of such tests is as follows
(1)
In 75-80 per cent of the cases the examination correctly indicates the guilt or
innocence of the accused;
(2) in 15-20 per cent of the cases the results are too indefinite to warrant a
conclusion by the examiner one way or the other;
(3) 5 per cent or less is the margin of proven error.
With improvement in and standardization of instrumentation, technique and
examiner qualifications the margin of proven error is certain to shrink ....
Although
much remains to be done to perfect the lie-detector as a means of determining
credibility we think it has been developed to a state in which its results are probative
enough to warrant admissibility upon stipulation.'75

Assuming the court believes its own conclusions about the data, why does the
court think that 5 percent error leaves a lot of room for improvement? How
much other evidence that factfinders receive has as little as 5 percent error?
And if 5 percent error is the stage at which evidence can be admitted upon
stipulation, how accurate does evidence have to be simply to be admitted?
Perhaps the usual rules of admissibility do not apply when it comes to
polygraph testing (and certain other kinds of evidence). Or perhaps the
problem is not the perceived level of inaccuracy but rather the perceived level
7
of accuracy. 6
F.

Demeanor Evidence

The law cuts a large window for factfinders to observe a witness and
determine whether he is telling the truth. The law urges factfinders to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and draw from those observations
whatever inferences they may about the witnesses' credibility. Here is what
may be the original polygraph: the factfinder's eyes and ears and his
intuitions about the information they provide.
73. Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
74. Witherspoon v. Superior Court of Cal., 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 28, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615, 617
(1982).
75. State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 282-83, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962) (emphasis added).
76. In authorizing the admissibility of low validity predictions of dangerousness in hearings to
determine whether the death penalty should be imposed, the U.S. Supreme Court approved such
expertise, stating that psychiatrists are not "always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only
most of the time." Ifa very low level of accuracy is sufficient for admissibilty on important questions
of life and death, then perhaps it is high levels of accuracy that present a problem. That is to say,
perhaps the more accurate something gets, the more objectionable it may be.
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The law appears quite certain that jurors have the ability to make these
observations and to draw useful inferences from them. Accordingly, it
protects jurors' freedom and power to use such information. Learned Hand
summarized this view:
The words used are by no means all that we rely on in making up our minds about the
truth of a question that arises in our ordinary affairs, and it is abundantly settled that a
jury is as little confined to them as we are. They may, and indeed they should, take
into consideration the whole nexus of sense impressions which they get from a
witness. This we have again and again declared, and have rested our affirmance of
of ajury, on the hypothesis that this part of the evidence
findings of fact of ajudge, or
77
may have turned the scale.

Given the law's reliance on demeanor evidence, one might think that social
science research on the detection of deception through ordinary observation
would cast considerable light on an important assumption. Fortunately, a
genre of psychological research is concerned with non-verbal behavior and
the cues it provides for detecting truth-telling or lying. Zuckerman, DePaulo,
and Rosenthal7x have carried out an extensive meta-analysis 79' of the nonverbal research literature on this topic.
Several important conclusions flow from their data. Most important,
perhaps, is that people are not good at sensing whether someone is telling the
truth. 1 1 Decisions about whether a statement is the truth or a lie are made
about as well as if one were tossing a coin. Second, the problem is not simply
that certain non-verbal patterns do not correlate with lie-telling; the patterns
upon which observers rely differ from the patterns that actually occur.
Observers correctly believe that people are more likely to be lying if they
smile less, commit more speech errors, speak more hesitantly, and speak in a
higher pitch. At the same time, however, they erroneously assume that lying
is signaled by less gazing, more postural shifting, longer speech latencies, and
slower speech rate. Furthermore, observers make no use of some behavior
which does signal lying: appearing less involved in their communication,
appearing less spontaneous, showing negative affect, making more negative
verbal statements, and using more adaptors.
Third, it is interesting to note that the unschooled law, like the unaided
and untrained observer, has been fooled. Table 4 summarizes the findings of
a number of studies on types of evidence that improve or diminish a person's
ability to detect lying. Visual access to the speaker's face reduces the accuracy
of detection of deception compared with the same modes of observation
excluding facial cues (1.49 to 1.00). An audiotape of the testimony with no
access to demeanor at all is better (1.09 to 1.00). A written transcript is not
77.

l)yer v. Macl)ougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952).

78.
Zuckerman, l)ePaulo & Rosenthal, IVerbml aiid Noniverbal Communicatiom
ADVANCFS IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAl. 'SYCiiO.OGY I (L. Berkowitz ed. 1981).

79.

of Deceptioti. ill 14

A meta-analysis is a statistical aggregation and analysis of a body of data contained in

separate studies. For explanations of such combinational research methods, see generally Rosenthal.
(ombinitig the Resulis of lndepeutdeit Studies. 85 PSYCIIOLOGICAIL BuLl.. 185 (1978); R. IAi;ir & 1).
PII.L.EMER, SUMMING UP:

80.

]lIF SCIENCE. OF REVIEWING RI'SEARCII (1984).

Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, supra note 78, at 39.
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dramatically worse than speech plus demeanor (.70 v. 1.00).1
The best
performance is obtained when observers have visual access to body
movements (but not the face) plus the sound of the voice (1.49). Of course,
even the best of these still is not a great deal better than coin tossing.
TABLE

4

META-ANALYSIS OF NON-VERBAL DETECTION OF DECEPTION
ACCURACY OF DETECTING DECEPTION (IN STANDARD DEVIATION UNITS)

Visual cues
Face

Auditory cues
Speech
No speech
Means
Transcript only: .70(6)
lone only: .20(4)

No face

Body

No body

Body

No body

Means

1.00(21)"
.35(6)
.68

.99(9)
.05(7)
.52

1.49(3)
.43(4)
.96

1.09(12)
.00'
.54

1.14
.21
.68

Number of studies upon which d is based is enclosed in parentheses.

Theoretical accuracy.
Source: Zuckerman, De1laulo & Rosenthal, Verbal and .Vopverbal Communicaio

of Deception, 14

ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCIIOLOGY 26 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1981).

The explanation for these phenomena appears simple enough: Observers
rely on faces to give important signals, and because liars think the same thing,
they control their facial movements. The result is that observers are
distracted and miss the most revealing cues. Contrary to its assumptions, the
law, therefore, might improve the ability of jurors to assess credibility by
covering the faces of witnesses with masks.
G.

Eyewitness Accuracy

The question of the accuracy of eyewitness identification has occupied a
huge amount of the attention of experimental and social psychologists
interested in making contributions to the legal system. Findings in this area
could aid courts in setting psychometrically informed standards for out-ofcourt identifications (lineups, photospreads) and other observations, and
could inform factfinders whether the circumstances surrounding the
observation were such as to enhance or degrade the likelihood of an accurate
report by the witness.82 The reaction of the courts to such learning has been
81. /d. at 27. Consider what this research does Io the judicial assumption that appellate judges
are in no position to assess the credibility of testimony-which they traditionally receive only in
written form-compared to Jurors or trial judges, who had an opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the testifying witness.
82. For analyses of eyewitness accuracy, see generally E. LoF-rus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
(1979); A. YARMEY, TIE PSYCIIOILOGY OF EY':EWINESS I'STIMONY (1979); Buckhout, E 'ewtne ss
Teslimo,', Sci. AM., Dec. 1974, at 23; Buckhoult & Greenwald,
ExI'ERT EVII)ENCE 1291 (E. hinwinkelried ed. 1981).

il'iniess Psychology, in SCIENTIFIC &
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mixed, but for the most part they have held such information to be
superfluous (jurors already know about the limitations on eyewitness
perception, memory, and retrieval) or to invade the province of the jury (the
data might seem to tell the jurors how much weight they ought to give to a
particular eyewitness' testimony).83 Courts might want to weigh the
importance of avoiding error in deciding how much accuracy is needed and
4
how much time to devote to achieving greater accuracyS
H.

Instructions

Several different lines of research have all concluded that the instructions
that judges typically give to juries are confusing at best, and sometimes
downright incomprehensible.8 5 These studies also demonstrate that by using
a number of techniques for improving comprehensibility, courts could
improve instructions and make them easier to understand, remember, and
apply.
In light of these findings, then, the following question arises: If the
instructions that judges give to juries are the essential link for transmitting to
the decisionmakers the rules of decision that courts and legislatures have
arduously worked out to their present state of development, and if the
possibility exists for more effective transmission of that information to jurors,
then why have courts resisted making improvements in the process of
instructing jurors? To forego this vital link is to keep the world of statutes
and appellate opinions from influencing jury decisionmaking. It is to render
the work of legislatures and appellate courts more or less irrelevant, and to
invite-indeed, to require-jurors to borrow rules of decision from the
general culture or to make up their own as they go along.8 "
Additional studies pertain to the effects ofjury instructions to use evidence
in some limited way or to disregard entirely inadmissible evidence that has
inadvertently entered the trial. These studies variously show that such
8 7
instructions have no effect or have an effect contrary to the one intended.
83.

However. the California Suprene Court has held that in appropiriate cases the exclusioin of

expert testimony onl eyewitness accuracy is reversible CIor. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351,
377, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 254, 690 P.2d '709,727 (1984). Most jurisdictions leave the matter to the
discretion of the trial judge, and they are Uneven ahout admitting or excluding. Although this issue
usually arises in criminal cases, evewitness tes imonv is lamiliar in sonic kinds of'civil suits, especially
torts.
84. Or adopt certain research findings as a matter of law and give them as a jury instruction. See
Walker & Monahan, supra note 48.
85. Segene l Charrow & Charrow,..aking Legal Latgiage Undertandable: .4 Pscholinguistic Study
ofJurv lIstrurtios, 79 Col.tim. L. R:sv. 1306, 1358-59 (1979): Severence & Loftus, Improving the .-bii
of-os toComprehed and ..ipph' CimioaIJory Instructions. 17 L.Aw & Soc'N RFNv. 153, 153-55 (1982);
Sales, Elwork & Altini. Improziag Compehension fo Jury Instructions, in PERSiEriVES IN LAWV &
PsYcioi.omY 23 (B. Sales ed. 1977).
86. The Model Heialth Care Provider I.iability Reform Act recommends adoption of' "plain,
simple and readily Understandable~ language in Jury instructions and the comprehensive Use of
interrogatories to ireduce unwanted variation in jury decisions. Model Health (are Provider .iabilitv
Refoirm Act § 13 (1988).
87. Broeder. The Univrert o] Chicago Jmy Projert. 38 NFB. L..REV. 744, 754 (1959); Wegner,
Schneider, Cai er & White, Paladoxical E/ects of Thought Supp/ne.sion. 53 J. PERSONALITi & SOC.
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For example, in a mock jury experiment, when jurors knew nothing about the
defendant's insurance coverage, the average award to the plaintiff was
$33,000. When jurors learned that the defendant did have coverage, the
average award grew to $37,000. But when jurors learned of the coverage and
then were admonished to disregard that fact, the average award rose to
$46,000.8 The practical reform implied-to ignore rather than draw
attention to such inadmissible evidence-creates a dilemma for the courts. Is
it preferable to do something practical about the problem of biasing the
factfinder, or to make a symbolic statement that demonstrates the law's
concern but actually makes matters worse? If this study's findings are
generally true, the law has an important choice to make; we cannot have it
both ways.
I.

Larger System Design

Perhaps the grandest feature of a legal system is the fundamental strategy
by which it strikes out in pursuit of decisions. The Anglo-American system is,
of course, directed at nearly every turn by its adversarial strategy. The major
alternative to this adversarial type of system would be an inquisitorial one.
The line of research begun by Thibaut and Walker,8 9 known as "procedural
justice," provides the first systematic empirical account of the difference in
effect of these two alternative approaches to designing a trial system. Among
other findings, Thibaut and Walker discovered that the adversarial system
made people feel more satisfied with the outcome of a judicial proceeding.!" ,
This was true for uninvolved observers as well as for the parties, and for
people living in continental nations as well as in the United States." And
while the original research was based on simulations of business problems
and trials, it has been extended by later research into more natural settings,
2
and the findings have been confirmed'
Subjective satisfaction of participants and observers is only one of the
dependent variables that the procedural justice researchers have examined.
Another interesting variable is the distribution of facts (those favorable to the
plaintiff versus those favorable to the defendant) delivered to the trial under
the two schemes. Thibaut and Walker found that the inquisitorial system
tended to deliver to the factfinder an image of the facts that reproduced the
underlying distribution of facts that existed in the case. The adversarial
system tended to produce a more balanced array of facts from an initially
skewed distribution. That is to say, the adversarial system tends to make a
dispute into a more equal fight even when the underlying fact distribution
PSYCHOi.OGY 5 (1987); Wissler & Saks, On the lnefficacv of Limiting Instructions. 9 LAW & Hum. BEILAv. 37,
46 (1985).
88. Broeder, supna note 87, at 754.
89. J. I'IBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 8.
90. Id. at 77.
91. Id. at 77-80.
92. Such work is reviewed in E. LIND & 1'. TYLER, TE
SOCIAL. PSYCHoOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
Jtusr'c:F: 211-14 (1988).
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favors one side. That balancing is produced, presumably, by advocates who
are motivated to seek out obscure evidence, to invent favorable
interpretations of unfavorable evidence, and to argue for their client's
preferred conclusions.
This finding presents would-be designers of a legal system with an
interesting dilemma: Should they aim for a system that reproduces facts more
accurately, or one that promotes greater citizen satisfaction and support?"
For present purposes, I simply want to draw attention to the finding that the
adversarial system has the power to bring out of clarity a potentially useful
ambiguity.
III
THE RESTRAINT OF ACCURACY

The examples of social-psychological research on the justice system given
in the preceding section do not, of course, exhaust the supply, but they do
illustrate this genre of research and its potential benefits. Empirical social
scientists approach problems on the assumption that solutions can be foundor at least that there are better and poorer choices to be made. If one can
identify certain values to be maximized, an empirical comparison of
alternatives can show which alternatives yield the most desirable results in
light of those values.' -4 Social and experimental psychologyi have knowledge
and methods to bring to the law to help determine which structures and
procedures do a more accurate job of finding facts and minimizing error and
unpredictability.
Among these examples I have tried to emphasize findings bearing on
potential improvements that the law has not adopted. More interestingly, I
have included examples of the obverse, that is, harmful changes which the law
has adopted. This is, of course, an unfair selection of evidence. But a
systematic appraisal of the degree to which the law has responded-positively
or negatively, purposefully or fortuitously-to all social science empirical
findings would be a massive and perhaps impossible undertaking. I seek only
to establish that certain seemingly irrational categories of the law's responses
to such knowledge exist.
93.

l'hibaut & Walker. supra note 7, argue that, considering that most of the disputes presented

to the legal system are distributional, or justiccC." Conflicts. resolution through finding the truth is
not an effective strategy. just allocations in the face of competing claims are best achieved by tie
pursuit of satisfying outcomes: there arie 10 "'true"outcomes. Id. at 548-49. (In such cases, facts are
at best the supporting Cast: they play no starring role. See M. SAKS & R. VAN DtIZFNiD, -TH USE OF
St :iNric E\,ln)Ec( IN I.TI ArION 6 (1983).) By contrast, purely or largely cognitive conflicts-the
sorts of pro)lems that scientists colfritt-ar'e not likely to he best solved by adversary procedures.

IThibaut & Walker, supra, at 556.
94. Evaluation research is the operational expression of this. The literature on the subject is
vast. For a publication devoted
cirelv to 1his field, see the collected volumes of EVALUTIA'|'ON
STItUllES REVIEW ANNUAL.
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The Flight from Apparent Accuracy

Some of these examples illustrate the law refusing to make use of help that
even some courts have acknowledged is available (for example, polygraph
examinations), while still relying on older forms of help that are demonstrably
poorer (for example, demeanor evidence). Reasons have been suggested
earlier. Some courts think that the technique has not yet achieved the
requisite level of validity, but the Valdez opinion shows that explanation to be
paradoxical at best. Another commonly offered explanation is that credibility
assessment is the factfinder's business, and the law is loathe to let anyone else
assist the factfinder in this area. Thus, error-laden credibility assessment by
judges and jurors is preferable to more accurate assessments by polygraph
examiners. Under this view, even if examiners achieved perfect accuracy,
their evidence could not be provided to the factfinder.
Another example of an apparent flight from accuracy is the use of
probability data. The courts' reaction to the use of such data as primary
evidence (for example, persons with a certain exposure to a certain
carcinogen are x times more likely to develop cancer than unexposed persons;
a defendant with blood group type Z is x times more likely to be the father of
the child than a person chosen at random from the population) has been
highly inconsistent, as we have discussed. The reasons given by courts when
excluding or when admitting probability evidence are merely truisms about
this kind of evidence: general probabilities used to resolve particular
uncertainties. What is said about the evidence admitted is also true of the
evidence excluded; what is said about the evidence excluded is also true about
the evidence admitted.
Stating countervailing truisms does not begin to respond to the question
of when such data are to be admissible (or sufficient to satisfy the burden of
proof) and when they are not. 95 Neither courts nor scholars have been able to
provide an answer to this question. ' 1"
One answer may be that there is no answer: Such evidence always is both
probative and yet ultimately incomplete or imperfect. Courts may choose to
reject probability evidence. In this case they choose to limit factfinders to less
complete or less perfect evidence for none of the usual policy reasons.' 7 On
the other hand, courts may choose to admit probability evidence when filtered
through a clinical expert but not when presented through a scientific expert in
95. The likely exception to this Situation is in class actions, where the probability data can be
about the class itself, and thereby provide a level of data (aggregate) that equals the parties
(aggregate). But when it comes to damages, though on average the plaintiff class and the defendants
might be fairly treated vis-a-vis each other, as among the plaintiffs (or among several defendants)
some will be overcompensated and others undercompensated (or assessed too much or too little).
By the nature of these data, we can never know who has won or lost too little or too much.
96. A possible answer is suggested by the structure of Chapter 4 ofJ. MONAILAN & L. WALKER,
supra note 9, at 159-274. That chapter divides the use of empirical social science data by the law into
future, present, and past factfinding. (Judges seem most willing to use such information for
establishing the identity of future actors and least willing to use it to establish past acts.) Id. at 228.
97. For the general policy of admitting all relevant evidence, see generally FF0. R. EviD. art. IV.
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t 8 In this case, the courts
a more logical (and more explicit) trial sequence.1
are
unwittingly choosing to (a) keep the data implicit rather than explicit, less
subject to full examination; (b) perhaps keep it from the factfinder altogether;
and (c) transfer the decisionmaking responsibility that would otherwise be the
factfinder's to the witness. Surely this creates no increased expectation that
the factfinder will reach the correct answer. Why do courts "not honor their
own formulas")!' when dealing with such evidence?
When probability data are offered to provide baserates (especially
evidence on the evidence) or when other kinds of evidence are offered to help
jurors assess primary witness evidence (such as expert testimony on
eyewitness accuracy), the probability data really amount to another layer of
evidence: second order knowledge. The primary witness takes the stand to
say x and the secondary knowledge witness takes the stand to tell the jury
something about the first witness. This process raises concerns about raising
the costs of the search for truth beyond a level that the dispute resolution
enterprise can tolerate. Those concerns may be most valid with respect to
experts on eyewitnesses, who then are countered by other contrary experts,
sending the trial off on what may be a detour that in the end provides little or
no improvement in factfinding. However, this reasoning may not suffice as an
explanation of the wholesale rejection of second order knowledge for two
reasons. First, such evidence is a kind of knowledge that could be judicially

98. What I have in mind here is illustrated by the following alternative patterns for presenting
the same information. The information consists of. (1) general scientific facts concerning the
phenomenon that is to inform the factfinding (for example, that symnptoms a, b, and c usually are
associated with condition X); and (2) particular clinical facts concerning the case at hand (the plaintiff
has symptoms a. b. and c).
Pattern A: The clinical expert (physician, psychiatrist, auto mechanic, etc.) presents the opinion
that the plaintiff has condition X. Under further examination the witness may or may not be asked to
explain the major and minor premises that led the witness to the conclusion. Thejury is only sure to
hear the expert's conclusion. The jtury's choice is whether to believe the expert's conclusion.
Pattern B: A scientific expert is offered to present the general scientific facts, the major premise,
that symproms a, b,and c usually are associated with condition X. Then a clinical expert is presented
to testify about the extent to which symptoms a, b, and r were observed in the plaintiff. 'he jury's
resl)onsibility, then, is to draw the conclusion as to whether the plaintit has condition X.
Under Pattern B, the factfinder gets the relevant information, weighs the information, and draws
its own conclusions. Under Pattern A, the witness makes the decision (about condition X) for the
lactfinder and, if the witness is not asked to reveal his underlying observations and reasoning, the
factfinder is left in the position of drawing conclusions based on the witness' credibility-probably
derived from superlicial characteristics of the witness rather than the substance of the witness'
knowledge.
Pattern B may be the more logical. But Pattern A is the one to which the law is more accustomed.
Florida v.Zamora (Cir. Ct. Dade County, Fla. 1977), Trial Transcript, Case No. 77-2566, repm/ed il
J. NIONAHAN & L. WA.KER, S11)1a note 9, at 313, provides an illustration of a case in which a lawyer was
too determined to present evidence in the order of Pattern B. The presiding judge was perhaps
overly comfortable with Pattern A and insisted on receiving expert testimony in that pattern or not at
all.
For information on another aspect of this general problem, see Monahan and Wexler's discussion
of the need to unpack the sometimes concluIsorv and imperialistic statements of expert witnesses in
order to see when and shere they have overstepped the bounds offtheir expertise and power.
Monahn & Wexler, -1Definite Mllaybe. Paoqf amd Probability in Civil Commilmemt. 2 L-Av & HUM. BEIANV.
37 (1978).
99. H. HART &.1. kIcNAtmm;iro,. sipra notw 51.
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noticed and given by judicial instruction. If it were shown that it added much
accuracy at little cost, there would not be much reason for eschewing it. As it
is now, jurors are asked to argue about it among themselves based on their
various experiences with the problem. Second, some kinds of second order
knowledge would result in certain kinds of experts being barred from
testifying. Perhaps, for example, document examiners would no longer be
allowed to testify about the source of handwriting. Such a bar might result in
a widespread savings of judicial resources with no significant decrease in
accuracy. Again, the flight from improved accuracy needs more of an
explanation than has been offered.
B.

The Pursuit of Apparent Inaccuracy

In a sense, anything that appears in the preceding subsection has its
counterpart in this subsection. Every time the law rejects information that
would enhance factfinding it is at some level choosing to reduce the likelihood
of an accurate result. In this subsection I focus on choices that amount to
something more than the trend toward inaccuracy as a mere consequence of a
series of flights from accuracy."' The examples below are somewhat more
independent, if not affirmative, steps at restraining accuracy by actively
pursuing inaccuracy.
Examples of this phenomenon include the reduction injury size, the use of
incomprehensible instructions, and the adversary system itself as a process for
factfinding. Whatever else may commend it to us, accurate factfinding is not
one of the advantages of the adversary system of dispute resolution."" The
choice of this fundamental procedural structure as the means of organizing
our litigation process may simply indicate that accurate factfinding is not the
dominant value or purpose of the legal process, and that we are willing to give
up some accuracy in factfinding in order to gain something else. The
reduction of jury size (when the traditional larger juries produce more
consistent and stable trial results) and the use of incomprehensible
instructions (when more lucid and coherent ones are possible and would
make the jury's decisions reflect legal rules rather than idiosyncratic criteria)
are much more of a puzzle.
Notwithstanding findings regarding reduction of jury size and decreased
accuracy, courts and legislatures in recent decades have approved smaller
100. None of this is to say that any of these by-products are not serious. A court that prevents a
jury from having its faith in ballisticians or toxicologists or eyewitnesses shaken may be actively
engaged in insulating these kinds of witnesses from attack. Some scholars have termed this approach
to factfinding "the exorcism ofignorance--a third alternative to the model of a trial as a "search for
truth" or a "fair fight." See Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 4 1, at 49-52. According to this
view, even if we cannot replace our ignorance with understanding, we can place our trust in experts
who will tell us what to believe, even though we have no demonstrable basis for believing tlat they
know what they are talking about. To allow data that tend to announce that the emperor-expert has
no clothes would vitiate this function of' the trial. Id.
101. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 7.
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juries.' 1 -' Thus, they have moved in the direction of increasing the error and
unpredictability of the decisions of civil juries. This increase applies to both
the decision as to liability and the size of damage awards.""' What makes the
reduction ofjury size a particularly interesting example is not only the clarity
with which this legal policy change increases error variation, but also the ease
with which the law could fine tune the level of error by adjusting the jury size.
Perhaps when increasing error becomes intolerably troublesome, the law
can readjust the level of error by once more changing0 4 the jury size
(upward). Thus, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
("DHHS") recently recommended in its Model Health Care Provider Liability
Reform Act that states require juries of twelve in malpractice cases for the
°5
express purpose of increasing stability and predictability in trial outcomes.
The DHHS lawyers regard the absence of such stability as contributing to
greater transaction costs of litigation (if settlement becomes more difficult
and more cases go to trial) and greater insurance costs (if the insurers'
response to more variable awards is to prepare for the worst in all cases).
Generally, the cost of avoiding variability and inaccuracy by adjusting jury
size and jury instructions would be little, and the apparent benefits would be
great. Therefore, the law's choices to avoid these advantages truly call for
some explanation, lest we conclude the law sometimes unreasonably prefers
the irrational over the rational.
IV
WHY DOES THE LAW MAKE SUCH CHOICES?

I have not argued or implied that the law is engaged in some perverse
search for wrong answers. Surely the law has taken many steps to structure its
factfinding process in ways that seem calculated to increase the ability of the
parties to present relevant and probative evidence to factfinders. The rules of
procedure"1 " and evidence 10 7 are filled with examples of efforts to enhance
the capacity of the factfinding process to obtain correct answers. Indeed, the
first data I presented in this article suggest that the legal decisionmaking
process achieves an impressive level of reliability.l""
I have argued that the law sometimes rejects procedures or categories of
evidence that offer clear potential to enhance the factfinding process, and that
the law sometimes even pursues policies that seem sure to restrain the level of
102.

The effects of sample size on standard error have been well understood since the end of the

nineteenth century and the development of the central limit theorem. See J. SCHUTrE, EVERi-TItNG
You ALWAYS WANTED TrOKNOv ABoUT ELEMEN-ARY STATISTICS 109-10 (1977). The origins of this

theorem date back to 1733, with the work of De Moivre. Id. at 192.
103. These effects were discussed in more detail in M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, supra note 34, and
the effect on damage awards is presented visually in Figure 1.
104. Or at least proposing to change.
105. Model Health Care Provider Liability Reform Act § 13(3) (1988). The rationale is given in
the "Description" accompanying the Act.
106. FE:. R. Civ. P. 26 (concerning discovery, for example).
107. FED. R. EVID. arts. IV, VIII (concerning relevance and hearsay, for example).
108. See supa notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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accuracy that the factfinders can achieve. In short, the law does not pursue a
policy of continual enhancement of the factfinding process. Why not?
A.

Three "Simple" Possibilities
1. Ignorance. The law may, of course, suffer from a collective institutional
ignorance about the sorts of findings discussed in Part II. If this is the case,
then as soon as the courts or legislatures become better informed, they will
change policies to comport with the research findings. While this possibility
surely explains some of the law's policy choices, I do not think it can explain
certain persistent patterns of restraint. In a number of the illustrations
offered, the courts stared directly at the data, understood them, and yet
plainly acted contrary to their implications."t 9
2. Inertia. Another popular explanation would be that the law is slow to stir
itself from its old ways. It is so comfortable with its traditional forms that it
prefers familiar old errors to strange new corrections. While this theory may
explain some refusals to change, I find it generally unpersuasive because the
law does change itself with considerable regularity. And if we look at the
particular examples discussed above, some of them represent abrupt and
widespread change from traditional forms (for example, jury size reductions)
and leaps into the unfamiliar and uncomfortable (for example, forensic
science).
3. Other Values. A third possible explanation is that accuracy is not
everything, and that reliable and valid factfinding has merely been trumped by
other legitimate values that the law is pursuing. This possibility was discussed
at some length in Part I. Some of these other values are explicit in the Federal
Rules of Evidence themselves. Examples include: exclusion of some relevant
evidence because of time restraints (Rule 403), inadmissibility of compromise
offers (Rule 408, 409), and of subsequent remedial measures (Rule 407), so as
not to discourage their being taken. Other values include the preservation of
party control of case presentation and the passivity of factfinders.
More elaborate versions of this view find expression in the writings of
Resnik,I 11 Mashaw,'II Leff,' 12 and other scholars. For example, in rejecting
the introduction of some kinds of probability evidence as a basis for
decisionmaking, Tribe' I" has argued that the law has to pretend that its
processes have produced correct results, even when we can document and
quantify the uncertainty that is inherent in the factfinding process, because
one of the law's functions is to make us feel good about the results we have
109. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (reaffirming constitutionality of' the sixperson jury, and ignoring studies detailing problems associated with this reduction): State v. Valdez,
91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
110. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 1006-16 (1984).
111. J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) (discussing dignitary values
in administrative law).
112. L.eff Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978).
113.
'ribe, supra note 49.
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produced."1 4 I do not doubt that the law is pursuing multiple and sometimes
contradictory goals, and must inevitably make tradeoffs among competing
values. But I do have some trouble with the notion that the trial process
ought to be an ignoring of uncertainty or an "exorcism of ignorance"I 15 -that
is, a process by which we comfort ourselves in decisionmaking by allowing socalled experts to make decisions for us. In other contexts, such as selling
products or delivering services, we might simply call this fraud. ''l When the
"other values" argument goes this far, I think it goes too far.'1 7
As noted in Part I, by not heeding some of the findings presented in Part
II, the law seems to serve none of these "other values," but instead only
reduces accuracy and raises costs, as when it uses unvalidated but asserted
expertise. Thus, in such cases, the law serves only an "exorcism of
ignorance" function. Surely we expect the law to be doing something more.
B.

One Not So Simple Possibility: Optimal Gray

The law may have less visible but more essential goals, such as maintaining
the basic functioning of the overall system, which in non-obvious ways affect
choices concerning individual procedural or evidentiary rules. These goals
may even require that a margin of real error be preserved in decisionmaking.
Let us call these larger and more essential goals the system's meta-goals.
1.

The Law's Procedural Mleta-Goals.

These meta-goals might run along the

following lines: In order for common law courts to announce, refine, revise,
and reverse the law, they must decide cases-preferably cases that will
contribute the most to the law. The courts' pronouncements do not serve the
needs only of cases that go to trial, but also of cases that are settled and of the
many social interactions that never become litigation because they are
conducted "in the shadow of the law."' '8 Thus, the sampling of cases-the
grist for the case-deciding mill, the stuff for which the substantive rules existmay be an important procedural meta-goal.
I Fihe fact that Isome mistaken verdicts] must occur if trials are to be conducted at all need
not tndermine the effort, through the symbols of trial procedure, to express society's
fundamental commitment to the protection of the defendant's rights as a person, as an end in
himself. On the other hand, formulating an "acceptable" risk of error to which the trier is
willing deliberately to subject the defendant would interfere seriously with this expressive role of
the demand for certitude-however unattainable real certitude may be, and however clearly all
may ultimately recognize its unattainability.
1d. at 1374.
115. Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 41. Sometimes the law does not evaluate evidence
rationally. Instead, it calls on experts to assert a conclusion which is largely insulated from challenge.
This may be an exorcism-of-ignorance function of law, enabling courts to escape the burden of
making especially diflicult or painful decisions.
114.

116.

"All professions are a conspiracy against the laity."

G.B. SHAW, Tnp. DocirOR's DlEMMA,

Act 1 (1906).
117. [hat is to say, the law may from time to time be an exercise in the exorcism of ignorance.
But I do not believe that we can seriously argue that it ought to be one as opposed to a means of
providing the factfinder with useful, if unpleasant, facts and tasks.
118. See generally Mnookin & Kornhauser, Batgaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Diorce, 88
YALE I.J. 950 (1979).
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2. Mechanisms to Advance the Meta-Goals. If the courts have too few cases in
their sample, they will not have enough exposure to social problems to
provide effective guidance through wise rules; if they are overwhelmed by
caseloads, they cannot give them the attention necessary to develop
thoughtful law.' II
One device that might be helpful for insuring the right amount and kind of
sampling is the maintenance of an aura of error and unpredictability. If the
courts became ever more accurate and consistent, then attorneys would
become ever more able to predict the outcome of a trial without the trouble of
going to trial. If the outcome of trials could be predicted correctly, there
would be no need for trials; settlements might become swift and certain.
Without trials there would be no judicial sampling of disputes: no verdicts,
no appeals, no further development of normative principles by courts, and no
principled guidance for future disputes that might arise in changed social
contexts.
On the other hand, if there were no consistency in judicial decisionmaking,
then too few or no cases would go to trial. If the outcome of a trial were no
more predictable than the tossing of a coin or the spinning of a roulette
wheel, those would be cheaper and faster devices for reaching equally good
results. If attorneys' skills in understanding and arguing facts and applying
doctrines played no part in determining the outcome of cases, then attorneys
would never need to expend effort in acquiring facts and researching law and
thinking about how to present them to a court. Games of pure chance require
no skill.2,1

Thus, in order to keep the entire system operating, some level of
uncertainty is helpful. Parties then have enough knowledge of what a court
would do if their cases were to come before it12 and can plan and assess the
likely outcomes of the cases. Yet parties also remain uncertain enough so that
they are eager to maintain outcome control by reaching settlements without
trial in the great majority of cases. This range of functional ambiguity might
be termed "optimal gray"--a level of predictability that is neither too low nor
too high.
In addition, trial factfinders must not be allowed to dispose of cases in a
way that precludes appellate review. For purposes of keeping workloads
manageable, appellate courts might be pleased when cases are so well
handled at the trial level that no questions requiring appellate review arise.
But for purposes of allowing the law to grow, trials cannot be allowed to be so
119. Consider the perfunctory treatment that courts give cases when they are overburdened. The
development of the law suffers. W. Bablitch, Court Reform of 1977: The Wisconsin Supreme Court
10 Years Later (1988) (LL.M. Thesis, University of Virginia Law School).
120. This point can perhaps be made best by relating an anecdote from my college (lays. A
certain wagering game involving dice became popular for a brief time. One day several of my friends
came upon another friend who was sitting at a table by himself rolling dice. When they asked what
he was doing he quipped, "I'm practicing for tonight's game."
121. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law." O.W. Ho., Es, The Path of /le Lawi, in COLLECTED I.EG.iL PAPERS 167, 173 (1920).
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dominated by the factfinding process that appellate courts have no power, in
principle, to review them. To allow this type of factfinding domination would
damage the dispute-sampling function (from the viewpoint of appellate
lawmaking).
At the same time that the law must preserve the possibility of appellate
review of cases so that the more general doctrines are well tended, certain
cases arise that need to depart from those doctrines.' 2 2 The law cannot afford
(in terms of its available resources or its perceived legitimacy) to allow these
exceptions to be made explicitly and as a matter of some distinguishing
principres. Procedures must exist to allow courts to decide these cases
without disturbing or being disturbed by the general doctrines.
Let us reexamine some of the findings discussed earlier, now from the
viewpoint of serving the meta-goals and maintaining a zone of optimal
ambiguity.
a. Instructions. How does the judicial distaste for giving understandable
instructions serve the meta-goals? First, instructions serve the more
important purpose of reannouncing rules of the law. In doing so, it is more
important for the trial court to echo the appellate courts than to communicate
clearly to the jury. The real audience for those instructions is thus the legal
community, not thejury. Second, by keeping the jury only loosely tethered to
the law, the courts can keep the level of predictability from becoming too
high. Each newjury can have a somewhat different understanding of what the
applicable rule of law is. Third, the jury is freer to render individualized
justice in the case at hand. Its verdict is important to the parties; it is far less
important to other people in other cases. By giving legally correct, even
though incomprehensible instructions, trial courts accomplish all of these
good things. The first point enhances the law's accuracy and predictability,
the second restrains its accuracy and predictability, and the third does both:
enhancing the rendering of particularized justice while restraining the
predictability of the application of the law.
b. Demeanor "evidence. " Flexibility in the factfinding process simultaneously protects litigants from the rigid application of the law and gives
appellate courts an opportunity to reinforce doctrines while allowing
departures from those doctrines to be made (by the jury) in a way that
protects the law from charges of inconsistency. If judges had to carve out
explicit exceptions with more frequency than they already do, the legitimacy
of thejudicial process would be highly questioned. But ifjuries do so because
of their first-hand observations of witness demeanor that is quite a different

122. Examples include the "widow's law," releasing widows from promises to pay their deceased
husbands' debts. For more information on this and other special exceptions to contract doctrine, see
Kronman, Palernalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YAIE L.J. 763 (1983).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 5 1: No. 4

story. The doctrine can remain intact; but the departure from doctrine in
individual cases is protected.'

23

Certain advances in accurate factfinding would interfere with these more
important functions of adjudication. If assessment of demeanor were
recognized as less diagnostic of lying than the reading of a transcript or
viewing of a videotaped record of a trial, then the jury's departure from the
correct result on the facts and the doctrine would lose its protective
insulation. To disregard the research on detection of deception and to
continue to act as though factfinders at trial have special powers to assess
deception is to adopt a legal fiction that is helpful to the overall process. To
incorporate such research might do more harm than good to the overall
process. It does not matter if demeanor provides no cues or even if it
provides miscues to credibility; the vague ideas of demeanor and credibility
assessment serve a useful function. Social science research on the detection
of deception shows that the emperor has no clothes, and incorporating that
research into the law procedurally would diminish the meta-goal of optimal
ambiguity even if it would lead to procedures that improved factfinding in the
individual case.
c. Polygraph. The same is true of polygraph testing. The problem is not
that polygraph examinations are worse than jurors; it is that they are or
threaten to be better. And the better they become, the greater a hazard they
will pose. Imagine that polygraph testing produced a 100 percent accurate
evaluation concerning whether any given statement by a witness were true or
false. The limitations that such polygraph evidence would place on factfinders
would greatly hamstring the legal process. It would produce more
predictable results, compel adherence to general doctrine in particular cases,
upset the balance between more or less fixed doctrines tempered by
individualized justice, and begin to interfere with the law's need to sample
cases. In short, it might shift trial outcomes out of the zone of optimal
2
gray. '

4

123. Consider the following cases in Awhich juries, without disobeying the law, made improbable
findings of fact, based in part on witness demeanor: Calvanese v. Babcock, 10 Mass. App. 726, 412
N.E.2d 385 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Roque, 414 N.E.2d 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Berry v.
Chaplin, 74 Cal. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946). In each of these cases, expert testimony was
disregarded in favor of contrary lay testimony, despite the implausibility of the lay testimony.
Arguably, the jury was creating new substantive rules, or at least carving out special exceptions to the
law, in order to reach a satisfying result. By allowing the jury such leeway with respect to demeanor
and credibility assessments, the legal system provides forjustice-of a sort-to be done and protects
the integrity of the law.
124. The law faces a new challenge with the alleged invention of technology for "genetic
fingerprinting." It has been touted as a nearly perfect tool for determining whether genetic material
found at the scene of a crime (or in some civil context) belongs to the defendant. By taking the
guesswork out of identification, it will revolutionize factfinding. Whether it is all that it is cracked up
to be, and whether courts can distinguish science fiction from science, remains to be seen. See
Thompson & Ford, DAV4 Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the Xew Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L.
RE'v. 45 (1989). But assuming the technique is approximately as flawless as its proponents claim, the
optimal gray view of the trial process suggests that the courts will be ambivalent about it. It may be
too good. rraditional forensic science, by contrast, may be just what is desired by the law. Its error
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3. Reliability: Actual versus Perceived. As mentioned earlier in this article, the
belief seems widespread that the outcomes of trials are unpredictable. The
data about reliability tend to contradict that widespread belief. 1'2 5 But the
belief in uncertainty advances the meta-goal. Lawyers and their clients will
settle cases in part because they do not trust their expectations sufficiently to
proceed to trial. Yet they have a clear enough idea of the likely outcome that
they can and do reach a settlement. At the same time, too much uncertainty
makes settlement difficult, creating a pressure for cases to go to trial. Clearly,
an optimal balance of pressures to settle and to proceed to trial-of clarity
and ambiguity-must be maintained. Generally, parties will settle all but 5 to
10 percent of the cases filed. '2 " This rate of settlement may be optimal, or it
may need to change in response to changes in society and in the legal system.
At the end of the day, it appears that both the legal process and lawyers are
more surefooted than people, including judges and lawyers themselves,
realize. And, ironically, the perception of optimal unpredictability contributes
2 7

to that surefootedness.'-

rates, so long as juries have some sense of them, are just what the courts need: informational help
for factfinders that is adequate but not absolute.
125. Law professors commonly tell their students, and lawyers commonly tell their clients, that
one can never tell what a judge or (especially) a jury will do. In a draft study of methods of
measuring health care quality and sharing that information With consumers (later published as THE
QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE: INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS, sopIa note 19), authors of one chapter on
discipline and malpractice litigation asserted the common wisdom that medical malpractice trials
were essentially events whose outcomes "'ere not predictable and meant little. Upon being
presented with the sort of data that appear in Table I of this article, the authors were both amazed
and eager to revise their chapter. Their revisions appear in the completed published study. See id.at
134-35.
126. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes. ll'at le Know. Don't Know (and Think II'e Know)
.About Ow .41legedt'v Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 27-28 (1983); Trubek, Sarat,
Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Oidinarv Litigation, 31 UCLA .. REV. 72, 86 (1983);
Conrad, The Quantitative Analysis oJjustice, 20 J. .EGAi. EDUC. 1, 6-7 (1967).
127. Would the litigation system be able to serve its sampling function if it could decide cases
with perfect consistency while counting on the erroneous beliefs of lawyers and the public to keep
bringing some, but not most, cases to trial?
Perhaps. Even if outcomes were highly predictable and were known to be so by quantitative
empirical researchers, those close to the cases might continue to be surprised, if only occasionally, by
the verdicts. Those surprises remain more salient than the more numerous non-surprises. (The
studies cited at the outset of this article, in Part II.B,
address the level of consistency in judge and
jury verdicts. These data suggest that outcomes arc surprisingly consistent. But clearly there are
some surprises.) This situation might be stifficient to insure continuing belief in unpredictability,
even of a system that was highly predictable. Moreover, since settlements dominate the system,
attorneys have little feedback to learn whether their expectations about the trial outcome were
correct or not. It seems that the necessary uncertainty is assured, even if everything were operating
at 1.00 reliability and validity.
But piobabty not. Eventually word would filter out that the courts have stopped making mistakes
and being unpredictable. Lawyers, perhaps even with the aid of empirical social science studies of
the litigation system, would become more and more accurate in their predictions, come to recognize
their accuracy, and have confidence in it. After all, physicians cannot know that what they are doing
is working by the observation of individual cases; they too must rely on empirical studies with control
groups to tell them whether the treatments they are using are working better, worse, or the same as
alternative treatments. (In contrast to lawyers-who mav disbelieve their and their svstem's
reliability in the face of actual high reliability--doctors seem to believe in the effectiveness of their
treatments even when the hard data indicate some of theii favorite treatments to be worthless or
even iatrogenic. See generally CosTs, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY (J. Bunker, B. Barnes & F.
Mosteller eds. 1977); TIlE QUALITY OF MEDICARE CARE: INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS, supIa note

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51: No. 4

4. Problems with the Theory. The notion that the law maintains itself in a
posture of some optimal range of predictability or unpredictability has two
general problems. First, this explanation may not be adequate to explain the
law's behavior. Second, other, simpler explanations may be adequate to
account for the law's behavior in the situations I have discussed.
For example, one might say that error and foolishness are inevitable
among any and all decisionmakers and systems. One need not posit a special
goal of instilling optimal error; it will happen. Each such error may have its
own idiosyncratic explanation. The search for a systematic, functional
explanation for them all might itself be a misdirected search for order in the
disorder.
Some unpredictability is inevitably present in life, and especially in the law.
So the law need not go to any special trouble to maintain uncertainty.
Uncertainty is assured. Moreover, the range of "optimality" would be quite
wide. As long as the law's outcomes are not a complete guess or a near
certainty, it would seem that the conditions I have suggested are needed will
be present.
But assume that I am correct in asserting that factual disputes would dry
up and disappear if the law did not keep disputants guessing about factual
outcomes. Does it follow in a world of 12(b)(6) motions, declaratory
judgments, and demurrers that an inadequately rich picture of the basis of
disputes will emerge, that inadequate sampling will take place, and that the
loss of refinement in understanding will have a harmful impact on future
transactions? Would we have a legal system that was "all normative" and out
of touch? We will never know for sure, but one could begin to test the matter
by comparing the quality of information about the world that courts get from
those cases that are disposed of through pretrial motions and those cases that
proceed to trial. Perhaps cases that raise only legal issues present, as an
incidental matter, enough of the facts of cases to enable litigation to be an
effective sampling system.
V
CONCLUSION

This article has focused on procedural and evidentiary devices by which
the law seeks to accomplish its factfinding. I have reviewed a broad array of
social science findings that inform us about the degree to which the law
enhances and restrains accuracy in factfinding, and that suggest means by
which the law could improve its trial factfinding capability. The law's trial
machinery appears to produce more reliable outcomes than it is widely
19.) This contrast may reflect the different needs that the two enterprises have in order to function
well. Clients benefit from their lawyers' doubts; patients benefit from their physicians' confidence.
Thus, in order for the litigation system as a whole to operate effectively, some real imperfections in
both factfinding and application of law must be preserved.
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believed to do, yet the law sometimes chooses procedures and evidentiary
rules that would seem to yield a poor degree of reliability.
I explore the possibility that these seemingly mistaken choices are a result
of the law's need to maintain its level of predictability within some optimal
range. If this "optimal gray" explanation has any merit, it has implication for
both legal policy and empirical social science research on the legal process. If
true, policymakers cannot pursue a strategy of continual improvement in the
reliability and accuracy of trial procedures; and empirical researchers need to
study the law at a higher level of abstraction (to help the law determine when
"accurate" becomes "too accurate") as well as to determine which alternative
legal procedures produce more reliable and accurate results.
If the "optimal gray" explanation is incorrect, then the law needs to
determine why it sometimes makes policy choices that demonstrably restrain
its factfinding capability, raise costs, and endanger other values. At the very
least, the law should determine how to make better use of available empirical
information to improve its factfinding performance.

